

CALIFORNIA
DEBT AND
INVESTMENT
ADVISORY
COMMISSION

ADVANCED CREDIT ANALYSIS

DAVID CARR KEVIN WEBB, CFA

Disclaimer


The information presented in this presentation is intended to assist public investment professionals. The content presented is informational and does not constitute investment advice or the recommendation to invest in any or all of the investment instruments discussed. When choosing an investment instrument for a public portfolio, the whole portfolio, investment policy, suitability, financial needs of the public agency and any associated risks should be considered. In addition, the information in this presentation is set to reflect the period in time in which it is presented and any changes that may affect any of the instruments discussed, such as legislation, reform or market conditions, or that may alter the relevancy of any of these instruments, will not be reflective in the post archival records. In such instances, viewers should be advised to use the information only as a reference as no updates to the records will be made. Please consult the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission's publication Local Agency Investment Guidelines for any interpretive updates.

Agenda


- □ It's All About Risk & Reward
 - Treasury Yield Curve
 - Default Risk
 - Credit Spread Risk
 - Downgrade Risk
- □ Limited Time, Staff & Resources: What to do?
 - WolframAlpha/WSJ
 - **□** FRED
- □ SRI/ESG

Risk & Reward

"You want a valve that doesn't leak and you try everything possible to develop one. But the real world provides you with a leaky valve. You have to determine how much leaking you can tolerate."



The Yield Curve Framework




The Yield Curve Framework: Santa Monica

Santa Monica-20180104 (Using 12/19/17 Portfolio Data)

Effective Duration versus Purchase Yield Where Bubble Size is MktWgtd Purchase Yield [1.456]

Par Amount (\$000): 715,947.33 | Effective Duration: 1.78 | OAS: 25.42



Ratings: Letters

Mod	dy's	S	&P	Fit	tch	Dating day	orintion	
Long-term	Short-term	Long-term	Short-term	Long-term	Short-term	Rating des	cription	
Aaa		AAA		AAA	Prime			
Aa1		AA+	A 4.	AA+	- 4.			
Aa2	D.4	AA	A-1+	AA	F1+	High grade		
Aa3	P-1	AA-		AA-			Investment and	
A 1		A+	۸.1	A+	F4			
A2		Α	A-1	Α	F1	Upper medium grade	Investment-grade	
А3	В.О.	A-	4.0	A-	F2			
Baa1	P-2	BBB+	A-2	BBB+	F2			
Baa2	D.O.	BBB	4.0	BBB	F3	Lower medium grade		
Baa3	P-3	BBB-	A-3	BBB-	F3			

Credit Risk

□ Default Risk

the risk that the issuer will fail to satisfy the terms of the obligation with respect to the timely payment of interest and principal.

□ Credit Spread Risk

■ The risk that an issuer's debt obligation will decline due to an increase in the credit spread is called credit spread risk.

□ Downgrade Risk

An unanticipated downgrading of an issue or issuer


Default Rates

		Time horizon (years)														
Rating	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	
U.S.																
AAA	0.00	0.04	0.17	0.29	0.42	0.54	0.59	0.67	0.76	0.85	0.90	0.94	0.99	1.09	1.20	
AA	0.03	0.08	0.18	0.31	0.45	0.60	0.74	0.86	0.96	1.07	1.17	1.25	1.34	1.42	1.51	
A	0.07	0.20	0.36	0.54	0.73	0.95	1.19	1.41	1.65	1.89	2.11	2.32	2.52	2.69	2.89	
BBB	0.22	0.58	0.99	1.50	2.05	2.60	3.09	3.58	4.07	4.55	5.02	5.37	5.71	6.06	6.42	
BB	0.80	2.52	4.57	6.57	8.38	10.14	11.62	12.98	14.17	15.25	16.13	16.91	17.61	18.22	18.84	
В	3.92	9.00	13.43	16.88	19.57	21.76	23.56	24.98	26.24	27.42	28.42	29.20	29.90	30.53	31.16	
CCC/C	28.85	39.23	44.94	48.55	51.31	52.53	53.95	55.00	55.96	56.66	57.32	57.93	58.60	59.14	59.14	
Investment grade	0.12	0.32	0.56	0.86	1.17	1.49	1.80	2.09	2.38	2.67	2.95	3.17	3.39	3.59	3.81	
Speculative grade	4.18	8.25	11.81	14.68	17.00	18.95	20.59	21.95	23.16	24.26	25.18	25.95	26.64	27.24	27.83	
All rated	1.80	3.59	5.16	6.48	7.57	8.52	9.32	10.01	10.63	11.21	11.71	12.12	12.49	12.82	13.16	

Bloomberg DRSK (Merton Model)

What is the 'Merton Model'

The Merton model is an analysis model – named after economist Robert C. Merton that is used to assess the credit risk of a company's debt. Analysts at brokerage firms and investors utilize the Merton model to understand how capable a company is at meeting financial obligations, servicing its debt and weighing the general possibility that the company will go into credit default. This model was later built out by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes to develop the Black-Scholes pricing model.



Main Driver of Default: Distance-to-Default


The DRSK<GO>framework for modeling default has its origins in the structural model proposed by Robert Merton.1 In this model, arm is viewed as solvent as long as the value of the firm's assets is larger than the value of its liabilities. The issue is that the value of the assets of the firm is not observable and must thus be inferred. The Merton model links the value of the assets to the market cap and debt of a firm, both of which are observable. The key insight of the Merton framework is that the equity of the firm can be viewed as a call option on the total assets of the firm where the strike price is equal to its liabilities. This allows us to infer the value of the assets from the observed equity value using a BlackScholes option pricing approach. ...

Santa Monica Overview

Ticker	Par Amount (\$000)	% Portfolio	Effective Duration	Bloomberg 5Yr Prob Default %	Analyst % Buy Hold	Purchase Yield
AAPL	7,000.00	0.98	1.20	0.58	100.00	1.22
ADP	2,500.00	0.35	2.56	0.42	95.00	2.11
ВК	5,000.00	0.71	0.54	1.60	90.91	1.65
BRK	2,000.00	0.28	0.60	0.46	0.00	1.16
CAS	8,500.00	1.20	2.50	0.00	0.00	2.08
CASH	60,372.33	8.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.14
CL	1,500.00	0.21	0.32	0.47	96.15	1.40
csco	12,000.00	1.68	1.92	0.59	100.00	1.77
DIS	13,000.00	1.83	2.00	0.62	92.59	1.90
FAMCA	16,850.00	2.35	1.68	0.00	0.00	1.48
FFCB	42,500.00	5.92	1.82	0.00	0.00	1.41
FHLB	116,900.00	16.28	2.04	0.00	0.00	1.49
FHLMC	166,761.00	23.25	1.85	0.00	0.00	1.44
FNMA	117,150.00	16.30	1.66	0.00	0.00	1.24
GOOGL	4,800.00	0.71	3.16	0.30	97.62	1.88
HD	7,000.00	0.99	4.12	0.42	100.00	2.18
IADB	6,000.00	0.84	2.58	0.00	0.00	1.72
IBM	7,500.00	1.06	0.09	0.99	89.29	1.24
IBRD	23,500.00	3.26	2.19	0.00	0.00	1.44
IFC	10,000.00	1.37	3.05	0.00	0.00	1.13
JNJ	10,000.00	1.40	2.85	0.32	88.46	1.63
ко	7,000.00	1.00	2.72	0.36	93.75	1.88
MRK	3,000.00	0.42	0.07	0.62	100.00	1.09
MSFT	12,000.00	1.68	2.41	0.49	94.29	1.77
ORCL	5,500.00	0.77	2.13	0.71	100.00	1.86
PEP	7,000.00	0.97	3.80	0.44	100.00	2.26
PG	2,500.00	0.35	2.70	0.35	92.59	1.90
QCOM	7,500.00	1.06	4.07	0.95	100.00	2.30
SBUX	10,984.00	1.55	2.94	0.61	97.22	1.92
Т	8,000.00	1.12	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.27
TOYOTA	7,000.00	0.99	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.29
TVA	1,000.00	0.14	0.77	0.00	0.00	1.36
UNVHGR	3,630.00	0.51	1.46	0.00	0.00	1.65

Santa Monica Overview

Issuer Matrix for Santa Monica-20180104 (Using 12/19/17 Data)
Showing All Issuers
Data Labels Showing Ticker




Credit Spread Risk


■ What is it?

- "Even in the absence of default, an investor is concerned that the market value of a bond will decline and/or the price performance of a bond will be worse than that of other bonds. To understand this, recall that the price of a bond changes in the opposite direction to the change in the yield required by the market. Thus, if yields in the economy increase, the price of a bond declines, and vice versa." ...
- "The risk that an issuer's debt obligation will decline due to an increase in the credit spread is called credit spread risk."

Credit Spread History



Credit Spread History




U.S. Department of the Treasury, 5-Year High Quality Market (HQM) Corporate Bond Par Yield [HQMCB5YRP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HQMCB5YRP, January 4, 2018.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate [DGS5], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS5, January 4, 2018. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=hkhD

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Credit Spread History




BofA Merrill Lynch, BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate A Effective Yield [BAMLCOA3CAEY], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCOA3CAEY, January 3, 2018.

BofA Merrill Lynch, BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate A Option-Adjusted Spread [BAMLCOA3CA], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLCOA3CA, January 3, 2018.

Santa Monica Corporate Spreads


Ticker	Par Amount (\$000)	% Portfolio	Effective Duration	Bloomberg 5Yr Prob Default %	Analyst % Buy Hold	OAS
AAPL	7,000.00	0.98	1.20	0.58	100.00	35.42
ADP	2,500.00	0.35	2.56	0.42	95.00	17.27
ВК	5,000.00	0.71	0.54	1.60	90.91	50.97
BRK	2,000.00	0.28	0.60	0.46	0.00	28.33
CL	1,500.00	0.21	0.32	0.47	96.15	53.27
CSCO	12,000.00	1.68	1.92	0.59	100.00	28.70
DIS	13,000.00	1.83	2.00	0.62	92.59	28.33
GOOGL	4,800.00	0.71	3.16	0.30	97.62	21.55
HD	7,000.00	0.99	4.12	0.42	100.00	32.34
IBM	7,500.00	1.06	0.09	0.99	89.29	86.22
INI	10,000.00	1.40	2.85	0.32	88.46	17.90
ко	7,000.00	1.00	2.72	0.36	93.75	22.01
MRK	3,000.00	0.42	0.07	0.62	100.00	85.48
MSFT	12,000.00	1.68	2.41	0.49	94.29	20.98
ORCL	5 ,500.00	0.77	2.13	0.71	100.00	25.35
PEP	7,00 0.00	0.97	3.80	0.44	100.00	31.92
PG	2,500.00	0.35	2.70	0.35	92.59	21.30
QCOM	7,500.00	1.06	4.07	0.95	100.00	79.50
SBUX	10,984.00	1.55	2.94	0.61	97.22	31.54
TOYOTA	7,000.00	0.99	0.28	0.00	0.00	141.80

Santa Monica Corporate Spreads



Santa Monica OAS vs Default %


Issuer Matrix for Santa Monica-20180104 (Using 12/19/17 Data)
Showing Corporates Issuers
Data Labels Showing Ticker



Transition Matrix

■ What is it?

"A popular tool used by managers to gauge the prospects of an issue being downgraded or upgraded is a rating transition matrix. This is simply a table constructed by the rating agencies that shows the percentage of issues that were downgraded or upgraded in a given time period. So, the table can be used to approximate downgrade risk and default risk."



Transition Rates: 5 Year

Average Multi-Year Global Corporate Transition Matrices (1981 - 2016) (%)

Five-year	transition rates	(%)
-----------	------------------	-----

From/to	AAA	AA	A	ВВВ	ВВ	В	CCC/C	D	NR
AAA	49.58	28.37	4.86	0.81	0.24	0.16	0.08	0.35	15.53
	(11.91)	(13.14)	(2.67)	(1.54)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.28)	(0.60)	(6.45)
AA	1.49	50.29	24.87	3.71	0.59	0.39	0.04	0.34	18.26
	(0.93)	(7.74)	(4.69)	(1.65)	(0.63)	(0.59)	(0.10)	(0.38)	(4.55)
A	0.08	5.22	54.95	15.13	2.15	0.71	0.16	0.57	21.04
	(0.10)	(2.31)	(6.65)	(2.21)	(1.11)	(0.88)	(0.18)	(0.42)	(4.05)
BBB	0.03	0.47	10.51	51.02	7.68	2.29	0.40	1.93	25.68
	(0.07)	(0.54)	(3.25)	(7.46)	(1.74)	(1.46)	(0.40)	(1.46)	(4.32)
ВВ	0.01	0.08	1.06	12.72	30.83	11.08	1.32	7.84	35.06
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.99)	(3.26)	(6.80)	(2.19)	(0.91)	(4.84)	(4.51)
В	0.01	0.03	0.28	1.63	10.55	24.83	2.99	19.25	40.42
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.58)	(1.22)	(2.73)	(5.50)	(1.02)	(8.87)	(5.51)
CCC/C	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.74	2.98	12.18	2.53	46.96	34.49
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(1.85)	(2.08)	(4.73)	(3.78)	(12.36)	(9.21)

Numbers in parentheses are weighted standard deviations, weighted by the issuer base. Sources: S&P Global Fixed Income Research and S&P CreditPro®.

Standard & Poors "Default, Transition, and Recovery: 2016 Annual Global Corporate Default Study And Rating Transitions", Table 36 on Page 83. http://media.spglobal.com/documents/SPGlobal Ratings Article 13+April+2017 Annual+Corporate+Default+Study+and+Rating+Transitions.pdf

A Ratings Digression Part 1

Lehman Brothers Credit Rating History






Source: Bloomberg

A Ratings Digression Part 2

"The ratings agencies had given their AAA rating, normally reserved for a handful of the world's most solvent governments and best-run businesses, to thousands of mortgage-backed securities, financial instruments that allowed investors to bet on the likelihood of someone else defaulting on their home. The ratings issued by these companies are quite explicitly meant to be predictions: estimates of the likelihood that a piece of debt will go into default. Standard & Poor's told investors, for instance, that when it rated a particularly complex type of security known as a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) at AAA, there was only a 0.12 percent probability— about 1 chance in 850— that it would fail to pay out over the next five years. ...

In fact, around 28 percent of the AAA-rated CDOs defaulted,

In fact, around 28 percent of the AAA-rated CDOs defaulted, according to S&P's internal figures. ... This is just about as complete a failure as it is possible to make in a prediction: trillions of dollars in investments that were rated as being almost completely safe instead turned out to be almost completely unsafe. It was as if the weather forecast had been 86 degrees and sunny, and instead there was a blizzard."




Silver, Nate (2012-09-27).
The Signal and the Noise:
Why So Many Predictions Failbut Some Don't (pp. 20-21).
Penguin Group US. Kindle
Edition.

WolframAlpha

Computational Knowledge Engine

www.wolframalpha.com





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What is a Computational Knowledge Engine?



what is a computational knowledge engine?











≡ Examples ≥ Random

Input interpretation:


What is a computational knowledge engine?

Response:


An engine, such as Wolfram | Alpha, that generates output by doing computations from its own internal knowledge base instead of searching the web and returning links.

So What? What can it do?





Hmmm... What else?



(for population age 3 and older)

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I bet it doesn't know football!

Input interpretation:

Los Angeles Rams (NFL team) | Atlanta Falcons (NFL team)

Team history:

Hide history

	Los Angeles Rams	Atlanta Falcons
name	Cleveland Rams (1937 to 1945) Los Angeles Rams (1946 to 1994) St. Louis Rams (1995 to 2015) Los Angeles Rams (2016 to present)	Atlanta Falcons (1966 to present)
city	Cleveland, Ohio (1937 to 1945) Los Angeles, California (1946 to 1994) Saint Louis, Missouri (1995 to 2015) Los Angeles, California (2016) Saint Louis, Missouri (2016) Los Angeles, California (2017) Saint Louis, Missouri (2017)	Atlanta, Georgia (1966 to present)
league	Western Conference (1937 to 1969) National Football Conference (1970 to present)	Eastern Conference (1966) Western Conference (1967 to 1969) National Football Conference (1970 to present)
division	Coastal Division (1967 to 1969) NFC West (1970 to present)	Coastal Division (1967 to 1969) NFC West (1970 to 2001) NFC South (2002 to present)

201				

	Rams	Falcons
games played	16	16
wins	11	10
points scored	478	353
plays	1000	984
yards	5784 yards	5837 yards
touchdowns	51	36
extra points	48	35
two point conversions	0	0
field goals	40	34
safeties	2	0
first downs	311	330
third down percentage	41.12%	44.67%
fourth down percentage	41.67%	30.77%

2017 season standings:

	C		

	W	L	Pct	GB	L10	Streak	Home	Away
Rams	11	6	.647		6-4	L1	4-4	7-2
Seaha'. wks	9	8	.529	2	4–6	L1	4–5	5-3
Cardi [.] . nals	8	9	.471	3	5-5	W2	5-3	3-6
49ers	6	10	.375	4.5	6-4	W5	3-5	3-5

Definitions »

NFC South:

	W	L	Pct	GB	L10	Streak	Home	Away
Saints	12	5	.706		7–3	L1	8-1	4-4
Panth [:] . ers	11	5	.688	.5	7–3	L1	6–2	5-3
Falco: ns	11	6	.647	1	7–3	W1	5-3	6–3
Bucca: neers	6	11	.353	6	4–6	W1	4-4	2-7



Source: WolframAlpha on 1/4/18

WolframAlpha & Credit Analysis





AAPL vs IBM vs MSFT

☆

□

Fundamentals and financials:

Fundamentals ▼

	Apple	IBM	Microsoft
market cap	\$876.1 billion	\$146.7 billion	\$666.2 billion
revenue	\$229.2 billion	\$78.37 billion	\$94.04 billion
employees	123 000	414400	124000
revenue / employee	\$1.864 million	\$189 100	\$758300
net income	\$48.35 billion	\$11.31 billion	\$23.09 billion
shares outstanding	5.087 billion	925.8 million	7.715 billion
annual earnings / share	\$9.26	\$12.01	\$2.99
P/E ratio	18.6	13.2	28.88

(based on trailing 12-month totals, last close price and annual employees)

Fundamentals and financials:

financials:				Ratios ▼
	Apple	IBM	Microsoft	

	Apple	IBM	Microsoft
P/E ratio	18.6	13.2	28.88
price / book			
price / sales			
price / free cash flow			
return on equity	+ 36.87%	+ 14.33%	+ 8.12%
return on assets	+ 13.87%	+ 2.25%	+ 2.68%
leverage	2.8	6.197	2.779
current ratio	1.276	1.412	3.12
debt / capital	0.4203	0.678	0.4778
net profit margin	+ 20.38%	+ 14.23%	+ 26.8%

(based on last close price, 12-month sales and 12-month averages)

Source: WolframAlpha on 1/4/18

WolframAlpha & Credit Analysis

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Source: WolframAlpha on 1/4/18

WolframAlpha & Credit Analysis

Last 10 years ▼

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
Last year ▼

2.87%

0%

Performance comparisons:

	average daily return	daily volatility	annual return	annual volatility
AAPL	+ 0.072%	1.96%	+ 19.9%	31.09%
IBM	+ 0.016%	1.39%	+4.2%	22.1%
MSFT	+ 0.035%	1.75%	+ 9.3%	27.76%
SP500	+ 0.025%	1.28%	+ 6.42%	20.32%
bonds	+ 0.005%	0.25%	+ 1.31%	3.91%
T-bills	+ 0.006%	0%	+ 1.64%	0%



Source: WolframAlpha on 1/4/18

Performance comparisons:

bonds T-bills


	average daily return	daily volatility	annual return	annual volatility
AAPL	+ 0.157%	1.11%	+ 48.7%	17.72%
IBM	-0.018%	1.01%	-4.52%	16.05%
MSFT	+0.13%	0.93%	+ 38.96%	14.77%
SP500	+ 0.073%	0.43%	+ 20.17%	6.79%

0.18%

0%

+0.75%

+9.23%



+0.003%


+0.035%

Correlation matrix:


	AAPL	IBM	MSFT	SP500
AAPL	1	0.174	0.472	0.548
IBM	0.174	1	0.304	0.509
MSFT	0.472	0.304	1	0.667
SP500	0.548	0.509	0.667	1

http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=AAPL+vs+IBM+vs+MSFT


Analyst Ratings Apple Inc.




Analyst Ratings International Business Machines Corp.



Analyst Ratings Microsoft Corp.





CALIFORNIA DEBT AND INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION

SRI/ESG Considerations



"A critical factor in the financial performance of investments is the investor's ability to identify drivers of the expected risk and return of investments. Financial analysts and portfolio managers are expected to be familiar with the financial factors that drive the value of an investment. However, issues that are difficult to measure in monetary terms and that do not form part of traditional financial metrics also affect the risk and return of investments—at times, decisively. In general, they are referred to as environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues."

Environmental Issues	Social Issues	Governance Issues
 Climate change and carbon emissions Air and water pollution Biodiversity Deforestation Energy efficiency Waste management Water scarcity 	 Customer satisfaction Data protection and privacy Gender and diversity Employee engagement Community relations Human rights Labor standards 	 Board composition Audit committee structure Bribery and corruption Executive compensation Lobbying Political contributions Whistleblower schemes


Environmental, Social, and Governance Issues in Investing: A Guide for Investment Professionals; Usman Hayat, CFA & Matt Orsagh, CFA, CIPM; Codes, Standards, and Position Papers; October, 2015. https://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2015.n11.1

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
Awareness is Growing



"A well-known indicator of the increasing awareness of ESG issues is the rapidly growing list of signatories to the United Nations—supported Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), the principal framework for investors who wish to integrate the consideration of ESG issues into their investment decision making. According to PRI, the assets under management (AUM) of its signatories have grown from less than \$6 trillion at PRI's launch in 2006 to nearly \$60 trillion as of April 2015."



ESG Resources (CFA Institute)



SRI/ESG Metrics

🗥 0n 05	C 162.49 Jan d Vol 5,19	O. W. 1999 1999 1997	0 162,44P	H 162.90	162,46 N K L 16 nmental, S	1.101		
IBM US Equity International Busin	ness Machines Corp	W	b	EIIVII OI	History 5		1.7	USD •
Summary	vs History	vs Peers	S (III)	ESG Scores R	V ESG »			
980 - 980 - 980	mental Better Social Neutral rnance Worse	Worse Better Worse	Su	becoSAM Rank stainalytics Ra comberg ESG D	nk		ISS Quality CDP Climat	10 6


Analyze Peers vs History				vs Peers				
Metrics	Current History	Change	Low	Range	High	Median Di	ifference History	
1) Environmental	==			♦hds. € Cong.			23	
11) GHG/Revenue 2) Social	20.3	-5.1 B	10.1	•	93.1	13.6	6.6 W	
21) Women Empls Mgmt Ratio	0.84	-0.02 W	0.42	+0	1.01	0.72	0.12 B	
22) Women Employees %	31.8	1.7 B	25.8	+ 0	36	26.7	5.1 B	
23) Employee Turnover %	<u> </u>		17.9		21.5	19.2		
24) Employees Unionized %	922	222	0.7		54	23.8	225	
25) Lost Time Incident Rate 3) Governance	0.17	0	0.04	• 0	0.04	0.04	0.13 W	
31) Independent Directors %	92.9/	8.2 B	16.7	+0	91.7	72.7	20.1 B ~~	
32) Percent of Board Members	20—/	-3.1 W	0		45.5	18.1	1.9 B ———	
33) Director Avg Age	64~~	0 B	55	+0	68	61	3 W ———	
34) Director Meeting Attd %	96	21 B	75	+ 0	94.8	87	9 B	
35) Board Size	15	2 W	6		12	11	4 W	

Australia 61 2 9777 8600 Brazil 5511 2395 9000 Europe 44 20 7330 7500 Germany 49 69 9204 1210 Hong Kong 852 2977 6000
Japan 81 3 3201 8900 Singapore 65 6212 1000 U.S. 1 212 318 2000 Copyright 2018 Bloomberg Finance L.P.

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% Women by Sustainalytics vs ESG (1/3/18)





Sustainalytics Rank (bin) vs. Esg Disclosure Score (bin). Color shows average of Pct Women Employees.

Source: Bloomberg. Analysis and Graphs by David Carr & Kevin Webb, CFA

SRI/ESG Metrics by Moody Rating (1/3/18)

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ADVISORY
COMMISSION

ESG Disclosure

56.61

28.10

Moody Rating: Aaa	
# Companies: 3	
	į

Median Sustainalytics: 93.66 Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 56.61 Median ISS Quality Score: 2.000 Median Board Age: 64.000 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.004043 Median Board % Women: 28.571 Min Board % Women: 20.00 Max Board % Women: 44.44

Moody Rating: A1 # Companies: 21

Median Sustainalytics: 79.75
Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 50.41
Median ISS Quality Score: 5.000
Median Board Age: 62.100
Median 5Yr Default %: 0.006049
Median Board % Women: 23.077
Min Board % Women: 10.00
Max Board % Women: 36.36

Moody Rating: Aa1 # Companies: 1

Median Sustainalytics: 68.35 Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 52.15 Median ISS Quality Score: 1.000 Median Board Age: 64.000 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.005631 Median Board % Women: 25.000 Min Board % Women: 25.00 Max Board % Women: 25.00

Moody Rating: A3 # Companies: 57

Median Sustainalytics: 59.02 Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 38.72 Median ISS Quality Score: 4.000 Median Board Age: 63.250 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.007596 Median Board % Women: 23.077 Min Board % Women: 7.14 Max Board % Women: 40.00

Moody Rating: A2 # Companies: 38

Median Sustainalytics: 51.85 Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 28.10 Median ISS Quality Score: 4.000 Median Board Age: 62.441 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.006466 Median Board % Women: 23.077 Moody Rating: Aa2 # Companies: 5

Median Sustainalytics: 50.52 Median Bloomberg ESG Score: 42.15

Median ISS Quality Score: 9.000 Median Board Age: 59.500 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.004496 Median Board % Women: 25.000 Min Board % Women: 18.18 Max Board % Women: 33.33

Moody Rating: Aa3 # Companies: 4

Median Sustainalytics: 46.75 Median Bloomberg ESG Score:

37.19

Median ISS Quality Score: 4.500 Median Board Age: 61.700 Median 5Yr Default %: 0.003548 Median Board % Women: 29.286 Min Board % Women: 13.04 Max Board % Women: 36.36

Source: Bloomberg. Analysis and Graphs by David Carr & Kevin Webb, CFA

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